Guidance Documents and Regulatory Beneficiaries by Mendelson, Nina A.
University of Michigan Law School
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Articles Faculty Scholarship
2006
Guidance Documents and Regulatory
Beneficiaries
Nina A. Mendelson
University of Michigan Law School, nmendel@umich.edu
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles/1558
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, and the President/Executive Department Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mendelson, Nina A. "Guidance Documents and Regulatory Beneficiaries." Admin. & Regulatory L. News 31, no. 4 (2006): 8-10.
Guidance Documents and 
Regulatory Beneficiaries 
The World of Guidance 
Documents 
Federal agencies rely heavily on guid-
ance documents, and their volume is 
massive. The Environmental Protection 
Agency and the Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration recently 
catalogued over 2000 and 1600 such 
documents, respectively, issued between 
1996 and 1999. These documents can 
range from routine matters, such as how 
employees should maintain correspon-
dence files, to broad policies on program 
standards, implementation, and enforce-
ment. Documents in the latter category 
include Education Department policies 
on Title IX implementation, Environ-
mental Protection Agency policies on 
hazardous waste cleanup, the Food and 
Drug Administration's policies on food 
safety and broadcast advertising of phar-
maceuticals, and many more.Although 
these documents often resemble informal 
rules, agencies generally avoid Administra-
tive Procedure Act notice-and-comment 
requirements because guidance docu-
ments arguably qualify under the 
statutory exceptions for general policy 
statements, interpretative rules, or both. 
These policies now typically are 
express in disclaiming any binding effect 
upon regulated entities or upon the 
agency itself, a response to some recent 
judicial decisions requiring notice-and-
comment rulemaking for a guidance 
accorded binding effect, as well as to 
congressional concern about uncertainty. 
Nonetheless, a guidance document often 
evokes a significant change in behavior 
by those the agency regulates.And if the 
document includes an interpretation of 
law, that interpretation may also receive 
limited Mead I Skidmore deference in court. 
Finally, despite the lack of formal legal 
1 Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law 
School. This essay is adapted from Regulatory 
Beneficiaries and Informal Agency Policy Making, 
92 Cornell L. Rev._ (forthcoming, 2007). 
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binding effect, agencies are increasingly 
stating they will usually conform to 
positions taken in guidance documents. 
Consequently, a number of commenta-
tors have called for procedural reform of 
agency issuance of guidance documents. 
Over the years, the Administrative 
Conference has issued multiple recom-
mendations, including calling generally 
for greater participation and for notice-
and-comment for guidance documents 
with a "substantial impact." Other com-
mentators, however, have guardedly 
defended the current state of affairs 
because of a desire not to deter the 
creation of guidance documents, which 
help agencies supervise low-level 
employees and supply valuable infor-
mation to regulated entities regarding 
how an agency will implement a 
program. Moreover, they argue that a 
regulated entity at least retains a formal 
opportunity to challenge the agency's 
policy at the time an enforcement 
action is brought. 
The Interests of Regulatory 
Beneficiaries 
Thus far, however, the debate has 
largely ignored the distinct and sub-
stantial interests of those who might 
(inelegantly) be called indirect regulatory 
beneficiaries.These are people whose 
behavior is not directly regulated or 
who receive no government subsidy 
or payment, but nonetheless reasonably 
expect to benefit from government 
regulation of others - pharmaceutical 
consumers, women seeking opportuni-
ties in college athletics, environmental 
users, workers seeking safe workplaces, to 
name a few. Regulatory beneficiaries 
may have been specifically named in a 
statute or it may simply have been widely 
understood that the statute was meant to 
regulate one segment of the public to 
indirectly benefit another group. These 
latter groups have obvious and substantial 
interest in the way an administrative 
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agency "fills in the blanks" of such a 
regulatory program. 
Regulatory beneficiaries do some-
times benefit from agency guidance 
documents, if the guidance happens to 
be favorable in substance. Such a guid-
ance can prompt useful changes in the 
behavior of regulated entities. Guidance 
document policies can certainly be unfa-
vorable, however. For example, the FDA's 
1999 guidance document advising that 
pharmaceutical companies may advertise 
prescription drugs to consumers without 
supplying detailed risk information 
prompted a significant and highly 
controversial increase in television adver-
tising.The Education Department's 2005 
"Dear Colleague letter" to universities 
suggesting that on-line surveys of 
students could be sufficient to document 
insufficient interest by the "underrepre-
sented sex" in a varsity athletic team has 
also been controversial. 
Generally, regulatory beneficiaries 
suffer distinct procedural losses when an 
agency issues policy in this way, inhibit-
ing their ability to hold the agency 
accountable for its policy decisions. 
Regulatory beneficiaries lose access both 
to judicial review and to the process of 
agency decision making. First, with 
respect to judicial review, even if the 
regulatory beneficiary has standing, a 
guidance document may not be consid-
ered final agency action or ripe for 
review at the time it is issued, especially 
if the document expressly disclaims a 
binding effect.This obstacle, of course, 
plagues both regulated entities and regu-
latory beneficiaries.At least in theory, 
however, regulated entities can choose 
not to follow the guidance, wait for 
agency enforcement, and obtain judicial 
review of the agency's policy or statutory 
interpretation at that time. Unlike regu-
lated beneficiaries, however, regulatory 
beneficiaries generally lack any such later 
opportunity to obtain judicial review. In 
many cases, the aspect of the policy of 
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concern to a regulatory beneficiary \\ill 
be realized through agency inaction. For 
example, in the food safety conte:-.."t, a 
Food and Drug Administration guidance 
saying that it \\ill consider ready-to-eat 
food "adulterated" under the Federal, 
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act if the food 
contains foreign objects oflarger than 7 
millimeters in maximum dimension \\ill 
mean that the FDA is unlikely to bring 
an enforcement action against, saY. a 
manufacturer selling baked beans or 
pickles with 5 millimeter foreign objects. 
Needless to say, challenging a decision 
not to file a particular enforcement 
action is \'ery difficult. Meanwhile, a 
choice by a regulated entity to comply 
with a guidance - such as by sifting out 
sharp 7-millimeter long objects - will 
also foreclose enforcement actions and 
with that the prospect ofjudicial over-
sight. E \'en if there is enforcement 
litigation, a regulatory beneficiary \\ill 
have a difficult time interYening for the 
purpose of arguing that the underlying 
policy should be more stringent, since a 
court generally \\ill be able to resolw a 
particular enforcement action \Yithout 
reaching such arguments. 
Second, when an agency issues a 
policy in a guidance document, regula-
tory beneficiaries are likely to ha\·e 
significantly less access to the agency 
decision making process.Assuming the 
guidance document qualifies for the APA 
exceptions to notice-and-comment 
rulemaking. the agency has no obligation 
to seek outside vie\vs, disclose data, or 
respond to comments. Some agencies 
indeed seek no public input at all on 
guidance documents. Especially \\"hen 
the guidance document announces a 
significant policy, hmvewr. an agency 
may well seek outside comment. The 
agency may hope to gather new infor-
mation, identify significant feasibility 
problems. or flush out any political 
controversy eark to minimize later exec-
utive or legislative oversight. Indeed, 
agencies often claim greater legitimacy 
for these policies as a consequence of 
seeking public input. 
A draft guidance might be posted on 
the Internet or published in the Federal 
Register for comment, but wry often, 
agencies do not \\l.dely solicit comment. 
Instead, agency employees make ad hoc 
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decisions regarding public outreach and 
to \\'horn to "float" a guidance document. 
When this happens, regulatory benefici-
aries can lose valuable opportunities to 
participate.Agency employees often try 
to include those \Yho are frequent 
communicators \\·ith the agency. One 
agency reportedly uses as its starting 
point for public outreach lists of organi-
zations that haw commented on past 
rulemaking, or lists of contacts developed 
through agency meetings on other 
topics.Again, hmwwr, this process is 
often highly arbitrary.Among regulated 
entities, for example, a recent study of 
industry involwment in FDA guidance 
document development found that some 
industry representatives telt closed out of 
the process, finding it" opaque," while 
others found access to FDA staff to be 
easy, and the staff to be ··very responsiw.'"2 
Turning to regulatory beneficiaries. 
agency participation decisions sometimes 
overtly advantage regulated entities. For 
example, the Federal A\l.ation Adminis-
tration has e:-..-plicitly adopted an 
exclusionary approach in its develop-
ment of"ad\l.sory circulars," a major 
category of its guidance documents 
concerning a\l.ation safety The FAA has 
posted on the Internet an exclusi\"e list of 
17 associations, nearly all associations of 
regulated entities and related businesses. 
from \\·hich it welcomes comments on 
draft ad\l.sory circulars.The FAA"s 
posting e:-..-plains, "[W]e generally accept 
comments only from recognized indus-
try organizations. If you \YOuld like to 
comment on a Draft Ad\l.sory Circular. 
please submit your comments to one of 
the organizations listed below, as appro-
priate."·' The list includes no airplane 
passenger or consumer safety organiza-
tions. EPA's poliC\· on circulating its small 
entity eml.ronmental regulatory compli-
ance guides is to focus the circulation on 
small business representatiYes. Finall:~ the 
FDA has recently committed to seek 
public input in adYance of issuing espe-
2 See Erica Seiguer & John Smith. Perception 
and Process at the Food and Drug .'\.dminisrra-
tion: Obligations and Trade-OffS in Rules and 
Guidances. 60 Food & Drug LJ. 17. 30 (2(103). 
' See ··HO\Y do I comment on a Draft AdYisorY 
Circular:·· posted at \Y\\"\Y.faa.gO\·/arp/ 
publications/ acs/ drafi:acs. cfin +:Ocommem 
(Last Yisited Aug. 11, 2(1113). 
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cially important guidance documents, 
except where those documents are 
presenting a "less burdensome policy that 
is consistent ,,·ith public health.''" 
\\'ithout suggesting any across-the-board 
criticism of the FDA. one could imagine 
that regulatory beneficiaries might some-
times ha,·e a comment on whether a less 
burdensome FDA policy remains consis-
tent \\l.th public health. 
Finally. \\l.thout any conscious exclu-
sivity whatsoever, agencies that consult 
ad hoc on draft guidance documents 
\\ill tend to deemphasize participation 
by regulaton· beneficiaries. Because of 
direct contact with regulated entities in 
permitting. licensing. inspection, and 
enforcement matters. an agency. as a rule, 
\Yill know and have more regular rela-
tionships \\l.th regulated entity groups. 
GiYen time and resource constraints 
upon the agency. it is comparati\·ely 
convenient and ine:-..-pensi,·e to reach out 
to these same entities as a sounding board 
for policy development. The agenC\· also 
may haYe a greater interest in a good 
long-term relationship \\l.th these enti-
ties, since it ''ill \\"ant to procure their 
cooperation and compliance \\l.th the 
statutory regime. By contrast, the statute 
generally ,,l.11 not create any direct rela-
tionship bet\wen an agency and indirect 
regulatory beneficiaries such as food 
consumers, eml.ronmental users, or 
workers in hazardous \\"Orkplaces.An 
agenC\· official may ha,·e greater difficult\· 
iden~l.ng the appropriate people to 
contact and less interest in maintaining a 
long term relationship. \ loreoYer. regu-
lated entities. in particular. are likely to 
haYe Yaluable intormation - often supe-
rior to that of the agency or ofregulatory 
beneficiaries - regarding a new policy's 
cost and teasibility. Finally. regulatory 
beneficiaries are relativelv diffuse and 
unorganized. compared \\l.th regulated 
entities. and thus ''ill have te\Yer resources 
and less ability to find out about a guid-
ance before it is finalized or to obtain 
executive or Congressional oversight. In 
short. unless the agency itself chooses to 
" See 62 Fed. Reg. :':%::-: (Feb. 2-;-. 199-1 \noting 
that FD_-\ will seek public inpur aii:er issuance 
of these 2l.lldances): f.3 Fed. Reg. -321. - .'2-+ 
(Feb. 1-+.c21)00) (confirming san~e position). 
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give public notice of a draft guidance or 
initiates contact with regulatory benefici-
ary groups, these groups are likely to 
have less of an opportunity to participate 
in guidance development. 
Possible Solutions 
The procedural costs imposed upon 
regulatory beneficiaries as well as upon 
regulated entities when agencies issue 
policies in guidance documents clearly 
call for greater regulation. Such regula-
tion is unlikely to lead agencies to a 
world of"secret law," as some comn1en-
tators have speculated. Even with more 
required procedures, agencies will have 
significant incentives to go public with 
their policies relating to compliance and 
enforcement.These incentives will range 
from a desire to provide regulated entities 
with some certainty regarding a pro-
gram's implementation (a desire likely to 
be reinforced by members of Congress 
interested in certainty and compliance 
assistance) to a wish to avoid losing 
enforcement actions because the agency 
failed to provide "fair notice" of the 
requirements it is enforcing, following 
cases such as General Electric v. EPA, 53 
E3d 1324, 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
Nonetheless, requiring notice-and-
comment rulemaking for all guidance 
documents, which would include 
routine instructions to employees, is 
clearly overkill. Nor does a proposal to 
require guidance documents to have 
"precedential effect" - and to require an 
agency to give reasons for departing from 
a guidance document's policy - help the 
problems I am discussing here.While this 
approach would clearly reduce uncer-
tainty for those dealing with an agency, 
it also implicitly presumes that the 
guidance itself is valid and has properly 
implemented the statute. It thus does 
comparatively little for regulatory 
beneficiaries, because it affords them 
no opportunity to argue, say, that the 
agency's choice is not adequately justi-
fied or that the agency should be more 
aggressively interpreting the statute. 
Instead, some other intermediate 
solutions seem appropriate. Space and 
time constraints will permit me to briefly 
overview only three. One occasionally 
discussed solution is to amend the APA 
to require an agency to use notice-and-
Ad111i11istrative and Regulatory Law News 
comment rulemaking for "important" 
interpretations or policy statements, or, in 
the words of the Administrative Confer-
ence, those with "substantial impacts." 
That would mean that a court could 
invalidate such a guidance document for 
failure to comply with the requirement. 
Moreover, regulatory beneficiaries could 
more fully engage an agency on a policy 
before it is finalized, which could in turn 
increase the information to the agency 
about public policy preferences and 
technical issues, and the final rule would 
be subject to judicial review.The major 
difficulty here is the burden on courts to 
distinguish the "important" policies from 
the others.Judges have typically shied away 
from this sort of decision because it re-
quires so much programmatic expertise. 
Agencies could also make procedures 
more inclusive as a matter of self-regula-
tion. The FDA has done this to some 
degree in its "Good Guidance Practices,'' 
and the Office of Management and 
Budget has suggested it in its "Proposed 
Bulletin for Good Guidance Practices,'' 
posted on the Internet for comment in 
November, 2005. For a significant or 
controversial policy decision, an agency 
would give advance notice and collect 
public comment. Neither policy requires 
an agency to respond to comments, 
however, and neither appears to subject 
an agency's compliance with its policy to 
judicial review.What is thus unclear from 
these sorts of proposals is whether an 
agency will meaningfully engage the 
comments it gets. Comments from an 
entity with the clout to mobilize political 
oversight will, of course, receive atten-
tion, as such comments would in any 
event.Well-intentioned civil servants will 
undoubtedly try to read comments. 
However, agency resources and time 
would remain tight, and regulatory bene-
ficiaries could invoke no new external 
controls in the event agencies do not 
fully consider their comments. 
A third intermediate process-focused 
option would be a new right to petition 
to repeal or revise a guidance document 
that did not undergo notice-and-
comment rulemaking. No court has so 
far construed the APA to afford such a 
right.A citizen petition could give 
substantive reasons for an agency to 
repeal or revise such a document; in 
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response the agency could modify the 
guidance document or give reasons 
why the document should remain 
unchanged. (To avoid multiple succes-
sive petitions, an agency perhaps could 
publish a notice inviting the filing of all 
related petitions.) The agency's response 
to the petition would be subject to judi-
cial review. 
Any citizen, including a regulatory 
beneficiary, could thereby engage the 
agency on a guidance document's sub-
stance. By requiring an agency to supply 
crystallized reasons for its decision, this 
process would likely make judicial review 
more effective, and the inquiry on judi-
cial review would be a familiar one: is the 
agency's decision arbitrary or capricious? 
Although it provides only a belated op-
portunity to engage the agency, it might 
prompt agencies to use a more thorough 
participatory process at the outset for 
significant or controversial policies. 
On the other hand, depending on how 
many petitions are filed, the proposal does 
have the potential to in1pose significant 
costs on agencies.Those costs would surely 
be lower than requiring notice-and-
comment rulemaking across-the-board, 
but it is unclear how the costs would com-
pare to a more limited notice-and-comment 
requirement for "important" rules. 
Conclusion 
The debate over agency guidance 
documents has been incomplete because 
of the failure to adequately consider the 
interests of regulatory beneficiaries.When 
an agency chooses to issue a policy in a 
guidance document rather than a rule, 
indirect regulatory beneficiaries in 
particular can lose critical access to the 
agency decision making process and to 
judicial review.This is so even though the 
agency may be implementing statutes 
enacted in order to help those beneficiar-
ies.While empirical research would 
surely be useful in documenting the 
extent of these costs, procedural reforms 
that would confer greater procedural 
rights on regulatory beneficiaries seems 
clearly worth considering. Such reform 
would also represent a significant step 
toward ensuring the agency procedures 
better recognize and incorporate the 
legitimate, immediate interests of regula-
tory beneficiaries in agency policy. 0 
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